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THE AMICUS CURIAE: FRIENDS NO MORE?  
     
S. CHANDRA MOHAN* 
 
This article discusses the controversial origins of the ancient institution 
of the amicus curiae or ‘friend of the court’ and its subsequent 
development in a number of jurisdictions and explores to what extent 
this ‘friend of the court’ still remains a friend in present times. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
A term commonly used in both common law and civil law jurisdictions and in domestic 
and international tribunals is the Latin term amicus curiae or a ‘friend of the court’. Who 
is this friend of the court and what is his role in legal proceedings? Largely because of the 
remarkable manner in which this ancient institution has developed in different legal 
systems and been used differently even in countries sharing a common legal tradition, 
such as the United States and the Commonwealth countries, the important question is 
whether the amicus curiae can still be considered a ‘friend’ of any tribunal or decision 
maker. Has this friendship been well maintained or significantly abused over the years?  
 
The importing of a long-standing but ill-defined institution without adequate 
regard for its historical beginnings may well explain the innovative uses and/or the 
abuses of the amicus curiae practice. Discussing the role of the amicus curiae in 
litigation in South Africa, Christina Murray argues that it is easier to discover what the 
amicus curiae is not, rather than what he or she is. She concludes that the institution is 
therefore “versatile and that the amicus fulfills a wide range of diverse and important 
functions”1. 
 
This ambiguity in the concept of the amicus curiae, coupled with the absence of 
rules governing the appointment, appearance and purpose of the institution in many 
jurisdictions, although aiding its flexibility and development, has nevertheless 
occasionally produced some strange results. In Ex parte Lloyd2, for example, a lawyer 
who had accepted retainers from both parties found himself in a predicament. The Lord 
Chancellor hearing the case felt he had no authority to advise the lawyer as to which 
party he ought to represent. He thought he would overcome this problem, however, by 
appointing himself as amicus curiae and then advising the lawyer on the matter. The 
court thus became its own friend! 
 
                                                 
* Practice Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. The research for this paper was 
largely made possible by a research grant from the Singapore Management University. I am also grateful to 
my research assistants David Yong Xiang Wei and Lau Chee Chong for their assistance with the research. 
1
 Christina Murray, “Litigating in the Public Interest: Intervention and the Amicus Curiae” (1994) 10 
S.A.J.H.R. 240 at 242. 
2
 A 19th century case reported in Ex parte Brockman, 134 S.W. 977, 233 Missouri Reports 135 (Sup. Ct. 
1911) and referred to by Samuel Krislov, “The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy” 
(1963) 72 Yale L.J. 694 at 695. 
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In recent years, the appearance of other non-parties to a civil dispute or 
proceedings in the form of the intervenor and the lawyer holding a watching or talking 
brief has further helped to blur the identity of the amicus. Then there is the further 
confusion in some jurisdictions over the appointment of lawyers pro bono to represent 
one party in the proceedings as amicus curiae. And, as will be considered in the course of 
this article, the expanded role of the amicus curiae and the different directions of its 
modern development in many jurisdictions and in international tribunals raise a number 
of other questions. 
 
How and why has this simple Roman judicial device of a ‘friend of the court’ 
become so many different things to so many different people? Does the court still have a 
friend out there? 
 
II. THE MEANING OF “AMICUS CURIAE” 
 
As Bellhouse and Lavers have observed, there are few legal terms as “unhelpful” and as 
“imprecise” as the ‘amicus curiae’.3 The literal translation of the term from Latin, ‘friend 
of the court’, often causes confusion as to its present nature and scope and its true origins. 
Part of the uncertainty over the meaning of this term is the result of many different 
definitions of this ancient institution in various legal dictionaries and judicial 
pronouncements. These in turn may well be due to the vastly different development of 
this historical institution over the years in many countries including the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The literal translation of the Latin term amicus curiae as ‘a friend’ 
of the court is thus best described as being “deceptively simple”4. 
 
A. Dictionary Definitions 
 
A reference to a dictionary definition for an understanding of the meaning of the words 
‘amicus curiae’, beyond its literal English translation as a ‘friend of the court’, may not 
be entirely helpful in comprehending the nature of the institution. The variety of 
definitions in different jurisdictions, or even within the same jurisdiction, could well be 
confusing even to a person familiar with the term, as shown by the illustrations below. 
 
According to a modern Law Lexicon that is inspired by old English legal 
commentaries, an amicus curiae is: 
one, who volunteers or on invitation of the Court, instructs the Court on a matter 
of law concerning which the latter is doubtful or mistaken, or informs him on 
facts, a knowledge of which is necessary to a proper disposition of the case.5  
                                                 
3
 John Bellhouse & Anthony Lavers, “The Modern Amicus Curiae: A Role in Arbitration?” (2004) 23 
C.J.Q.  187. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon, 2d ed., (Wadhwa and Co., Nagpur, 2001997) at 102, with 
reference to 2 Co. Litt. 178, considered by the Malaysian High Court in Tai Choi Yu v. Ian Chin Hon 
Chong [2002] 5 M.L.J. 518 (H.C.) [Tai Choi Yu]. In Australia, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, an 
amicus curiae “is a person not a party to the litigation who volunteers or is invited by the court to give 
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The Corpus Juris Secundum defines an amicus curiae as a friend of the court: 
one who, not a party, but, just as any stranger might, gives information for the 
assistance of the court on some matter of law in regard to which the court might 
be doubtful or mistaken rather than one who gives a highly partisan account of the 
facts.6 
Another dictionary for the legal profession in the United States describes the same ‘friend 
of the court’ as: 
Individuals or groups who are not parties to a litigation, but who are nevertheless 
permitted to present their views on the issues involved in a pending case to the 
court in written briefs or via oral presentation.7 
Mellinkoff’s Dictionary of American Legal Usage, on the other hand, states that this 
friend of the court is “someone not a party to the litigation, but usually favouring one of 
the parties, and permitted to make an argument to the court”8. 
 
Such definitions raise more questions as to who an amicus curiae really is. Is he, 
for example, a respected invitee, a mere volunteer or a complete stranger in the form of a 
spectator or bystander? Must he be legally trained? Is he an independent advisor to the 
court or does he represent partisan views like all the ‘learned friends’ who appear before 
the court but are said to be there primarily to assist the court? Does the amicus assist the 
court on the law or the facts or both? 
 
In short, who is this ‘friend’ of the court and how does he become a friend? Is the 
amicus a friend of the court or to the court? This goes beyond semantics. A friend of the 
court assists by providing information so that the court will not fall into error. He does 
not seek to influence the final outcome. A friend to the court attempts to persuade the 
court to adopt a particular point of view whether or not he has a direct interest in the 
outcome. Is his right role to assist or to advise? 
  
The many academic and judicial definitions9 may well reflect the subsequent 
development of the institution in the common law jurisdictions. In Roman law, an 
                                                                                                                                                 
advice to the court upon some matter pending before it”: David Hay, Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 
4th ed., (London: LexisNexis UK, 2008) vol. 1 at 125. 
6
 (Thomson West, 2003) vol. 3B at 170. 
7
 Gerry W. Beyer & Kenneth R. Redden, Modern Dictionary for the Legal Profession, 3d ed., (Buffalo, 
New York: Williams S. Hein & Co. Inc., 2001) at 41. 
8
 David Mellinkoff, Dictionary of American Legal Usage, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1992) at 
27. 
9
 See e.g., judicial definitions in the following jurisdictions: Australia: In the marriage of PW and CA 
Rogers and Fernandez [1988)] 12 Fam. L.R. 467 (Family Court of Australia) (a legal practitioner or some 
other person who has the appropriate qualifications to assist the court); Canada: Grice v. R [1957] 11 
D.L.R. (2d) 699 (Ont. S.C.) [Grice] (bystander informing judge in a matter of law); R. v. Lee [1998] 125 
C.C.C. (3d) 363 (N.W.T. S.C.) (a barrister who assists the court, at the court’s request, and is disinterested); 
England: Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd. [1968] 2 Q.B. 229 at 266 (C.A.) [Allen] (role of an 
amicus curiae was to help the court by expounding the law impartially); Hong Kong: Hong Kong v. David 
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appointee was a learned jurist who advised the court at its request. In the common law of 
the Middle Ages, the amicus acquired an additional role that he did not have in Roman 
law. As judicial proceedings were in the public city square, spectators could readily 
intervene as amici to share any relevant information with the judge.10 
 
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE AMICUS CURIAE: TWO VIEWS 
 
To many scholars the exact origin of the amicus curiae is unclear and remains 
controversial. One commonly held view is that it had its origins in the common law 
despite its presence in civil law jurisdictions.11 The other view, shared by the writer, 
which will be considered in detail subsequently in this paper, is that it most probably 
originated during Roman times.12 This is because the Roman practice of appointing a 
consilium or group of independent advisors to magistrates is in keeping with the 
appointment and use of the amici13 in all aspects of Roman life.  Occasionally, the amicus 
curiae’s origin is attributed to both the common law and Roman law.14 
 
A. The Amicus Curiae at Common Law 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ma Wai-kwan [1997] 2 Hong Kong Cases 315 at 359 (C.A.) [David Ma Wai-kwan] (difficult for court to 
accept as amicus counsel who appears without invitation); Malaysia: Re Application by Hamid bin Hassan; 
Hamid bin Hassan v. Returning Officer, Karak [1979] 2 M.L.J. 183 [Re Application by Hamid bin Hassan]; 
Tai Choi Yu, supra note 5 (one who is invited by the court to assist the court and not a volunteer); 
Nadarajan s/o Verayan v. Hong Tuan Teck [2007] 7 M.L.J. 640 (H.C.) [Nadarajan s/o Verayan] (counsel 
for the Disciplinary Board of the Bar Association invited to be amicus curiae to assist court to arrive at a 
“just decision” in the public interest); South Africa: Grinshaw v. Mica Mines Ltd. [1912] Transvaal 
Provincial Division Decisions 450 [Grinshaw]; Connock’s Motor Co. Ltd. (SA) v. Pretorius [1939] 
Transvaal Provincial Division Decisions 355 [Connock’s Motor Co. Ltd. (SA)] (not the function of an 
amicus to seek to undertake the management of a cause); United States: Village of North Atlanta v. Cook, 
133 S.E.2d 585, 219 Georgia Reports 316 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (one who interposes in judicial proceedings to 
assist the court by giving information or otherwise); Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (a person or 
group seeking permission of the court to submit a brief in the action with the intent of influencing the 
court). 
10
 Michael K. Lowman, “The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin after the Friends 
Leave?” (1991 – 1992) 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 1243, cited in Israel Doron & Manal Totry-Jubran, “Too Little, 
Too Late? An American Amicus in an Israeli Court” (2005) 19 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 105. 
11
 See e.g., Frank M. Covey, Jr., “Amicus Curiae: Friend of the Court” (1959 – 1960) 9 DePaul L. Rev. 30 
at 34-35; Alan Levy, “The Amicus Curiae: An Offer of Assistance to the Court” (1972) Chitty’s L..J. 94. 
12
 See e.g., Krislov, supra note 2; “The Amicus Curiae” (1960 – 1961) 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 469; Fowler V. 
Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, “Lobbyists before the Court” (1952 – 1953) 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1172; 
Lowman, supra note 10 at 1244; Ernest Angell, “The Amicus Curiae: American Development of English 
Institutions” (1967) 16 I.C.L.Q. 1017; Michael J. Harris, “Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of 
Friendship in American Jurisprudence” (2000) Suffolk J. Trial & Appellate Advoc. 1; Wayne W. Schmidt, 
“History, Purpose and Philosophy of Amicus Advocacy: The AELE Amicus Program” (21 September 
2008), online: Americans for Effective Law Enforcement <http://www.aele.org/history.html> (accessed on 
8 January 2010); George Williams, “The Amicus Curiae and Intervener in the High Court of Australia: A 
Comparative Analysis” (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 365 at 367. 
13
  Rudolph Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907). 
14
 As “it has been traced back as far as the 14th century and even to Roman law”: Williams, supra note 12 at 
367. 
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The amicus curiae practice was an early institution used at common law. This can be 
seen from old definitions and descriptions15 and early cases recorded in the Year Books. 
According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, for example, the amicus curiae is: 
A friend of the court. One who, for the assistance of the court, gives information 
of some matter of law in regard to which the court is doubtful or mistaken; such 
as a case not reported or which the judge has not seen or does not at the moment 
recollect.16 
Holthouse’s Law Dictionary describes the amicus in different but definite terms: 
When a judge is doubtful or mistaken in matters of law, a bystander may inform 
the court as amicus curiae. Counsel in court frequently act in this capacity when 
they happen to be in possession of a case which the judge has not seen or does not 
at the moment remember.17 
In the Canadian case of Grice, Ferguson J. considered an amicus curiae as: 
one, who as a bystander, where a judge is doubtful or mistaken in a matter of law, 
may inform the court. In its ordinary use the term implies the friendly intervention 
of counsel to remind the court of some matter of law which has escaped its notice 
and in regard of which it is in danger of going wrong.18  
In the early common law, any person in court could apparently step forward as an 
amicus curiae to advise the court. The Year Book cases from 1353 show this to be an 
accepted practice.19 In the abridgement of 1573, there are at least three known references 
to the amicus practice. These include a statement that in “an improper indictment any 
man, as amicus curiae, can inform the court of error in order to prevent the court from 
suffering the mistake”20. 
 
There are cases of bystanders calling attention to irregularities in writs and 
inquisitions, to the death of a party in the proceedings and to relevant statutes governing 
the issues before the court.21 In the rather strange 1686 case of Horton and Ruesby22, Sir 
                                                 
15
 See supra notes 5-8. 
16
 Francis Rawle, John Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Boston: The Boston Book Company, 1897) at 138; 
William Edward Baldwin, John Bouvier’s Law Dictionary: Baldwin’s Century Edition (New York: Banks 
Law Publishing Company, 1928) at 69. Bouvier, who first compiled his dictionary in 1827, makes 
reference to 2 Co. Inst. 178 and 2 Viner’s Abridgement 475. 
17
 Krislov, supra note 2. See generally Corpus Juris Secundum, supra note 6 for American definitions of 
the term. 
18
 Supra note 9 at 702. 
19
 (1353), Y.B. Hil. 26 Edw. III. See Edmund Ruffin Beckwith & Rudolph Sobernheim, “Amicus Curiae --- 
Minister of Justice” (1948) 17 Fordham L. Rev. 38; “Notes on Amicus Curiae” (1920 – 1921) 34 Harv. L. 
Rev. 773; “The Amicus Curiae”, supra note 12. Collection of cases appearing in the Year Books will be 
found in Theloall’s Abridgement 200 and in 2 Viner’s Abridgement 475-476. 
20
 (1353), Y.B. 7 Edw. III, 65, cited in Covey, supra note 11 at 33. 
21
 Krislov, supra note 2; Covey, ibid. at 34-35. “The Amicus Curiae”, supra note 12. In South Africa the 
amicus curiae has also been judicially defined as “a member of the bar, or other bystander, who advises the 
court regarding a point of law or fact upon which information is required: Grinshaw, supra note 9. 
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George Treby informed the court that, as Member of Parliament, he had been present in 
Parliament when it passed the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries and appears to have been 
allowed to enlighten the court on what he perceived to be the true intention of Parliament 
in enacting that Act. 
 
In earlier years, such intervention by third parties could only be by amici who  
were barristers, although by the statute of 4 Hen.IV (1403), any stranger could move the 
court as amicus curiae. The custom included “instructing, warning, informing and 
moving the court”23. The amicus curiae continues to have been sustained over the 
centuries as an institution, not only to preserve the “honour of the court” to deliver proper 
judgment in individual cases, but also, in the public interest, to continue the rational 
development of the law “as a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness and for the 
preservation of free government”24. 
1. Suggested reasons for the common law origins of the amicus curiae 
(a) Inherent right of court to require assistance: Various reasons have been suggested as 
to why the amicus curiae was developed at common law. One is that it was a “construct 
of the common law” based on the inherent jurisdiction of a court to require assistance 
from members of the legal profession to whom it had given special rights to practise their 
profession.25  
 
(b) The ‘bystander’ theory: One writer has, however, suggested another possible source 
from which the amicus practice could have begun.26 He concedes that his case, at best, 
rests on “some secondary confirmation” from early common law practice.27 Until the 
middle common law, a defendant in a serious criminal charge was not allowed counsel to 
represent him. The reason for that rule was that the accused must answer a serious charge 
himself and not have a lawyer speak on his behalf.28 In a study of the history of the 
English Bar, Herman Cohen explains that the resultant ritual of the accused being 
accompanied to court by his friends was partly to check on his accuser’s entourage or 
guard “against vengeance without law”29. 
  
Gradually, bystanders, who were not necessarily lawyers, were allowed to provide 
assistance to the court. Some support for this appears in Coke’s Institutes: 
                                                                                                                                                 
22
 (1686), Com. 33, 90 E.R. 326. 
23
 See Baldwin, supra note 16 at 69. 
24
 Beckwith & Sobernheim, supra note 19. 
25
 Williams, supra note 12 at 366; Johannes Chan, “Amicus Curiae and Non-Party Intervention” (1997) 27 
Hong Kong L.J. 391 at 394. 
26
 Covey, supra note 11. Covey accepts that there is no “direct confirmation or denial” for this theory from 
the historical data but “some secondary confirmation” from the early common law practice. 
27
 Ibid., at 35 
28
 Herman Cohen, A History of the English Bar and Attornatus to 1450 (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 
1929) at 4, 12-13, citing the works of Latin writings known as Leges Henrici Primi attributed to a scholar 
known as Quadripartitus. 
29
 Cohen, ibid. at 12. 
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And after the plea of not guilty, the prisoner can have no counsel assigned to him. 
[A]ny learned man that is present may inform the court for the benefit of the 
prisoner of anything that may make the proceedings erroneous.30 
The amicus practice, it is suggested, was therefore established to avoid judicial errors and 
to thus ensure justice to undefended defendants in criminal cases by permitting lawyers 
present in court to assist the judge.31 
 
This ‘bystander intervention’ may have been a natural development of the amicus 
practice at common law, especially in criminal cases in early England. Some scholars 
question whether bystander participation truly represents the nature and purpose of the 
amicus curiae’s respectable beginnings. To them the intervention by ‘bystanders’ and 
other passers-by must have been rare indeed and not a principal feature of the manner in 
which the amicus curiae functioned even at common law. According to Bellhouse and 
Lavers, for example, the picture of unemployed or otherwise unengaged counsel and 
other bystanders eagerly awaiting opportunities to make themselves useful to the court, 
“is rich in comic possibilities, if not absolutely weird”32. Banner helpfully suggests that at 
best an intervening lawyer present in court was only “chiming in with a suggestion”33 as 
he would have merely relied on his memory of a precedent and would have done no 
preparation by way of research or writing in the manner of one having conduct of the 
defence.  
 
A judicial system based on inputs by bystanders, onlookers and other busy-bodies 
is hard to imagine. Historical evidence, however, seems to support such a practice in 
England before the development and growth of the legal profession and the change of 
laws to allow legal representation in all criminal cases. A study of the early presence of 
the amicus curiae in common law and at the English Bar indicates that intervention by 
legally trained bystanders was not infrequent.34 
 
By about 1300, the serjeants-at-law (the early Barristers) were established but 
they were a “small wieldy body”35 in active legal practice. They were easy to consult and 
even the Chancellor of the King’s council was frequently ordered to consult them, surely 
an emulation of the practice the Roman Emperors had in place.36 This explains the 
number of cases in the Year Books where lawyers were “jumping up, as it were, and 
                                                 
30
 3 Coke’s Institutes 29 (Brooke ed., 1779). See also Chitty’s description: 1 Chitty, Criminal Law 308, 2d 
ed. (1832), cited in Covey, supra note 11. 
31
 See e.g., the Tilburne’s Case (1649) 4 State Trials 1270; Ratcliffe’s Case (1746) 18 State Trials 429 
referred to in Beckwith & Sobernheim, supra note 19. 
32
 Bellhouse & Lavers, supra note 3. The “bystander” explanation for the institution no doubt contained in 
a number of dictionaries appears in many writings. See e.g., Murray, supra note 1; Stuart Banner, “The 
Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and their Friends, 1790-1890” (2003) 20 Const. 
Commentary 111. 
33
 Banner, ibid. at 121. 
34
 Cohen, supra note 28; Lowman, supra note 10. 
35
 Cohen, ibid. at 218-219. 
36
 Ibid. at 220, n. (z) refers to the “many references in Index to Rot.Parl.seargeant-at law, eg in 1330, 1347, 
etc., normally to assist the Triers”. 
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arguing without being told for whom they appear”37. This is because, as Cohen explains, 
they were glad to offer legal solutions to the court, being “a small happy family, amici 
inter se and amici curiae”. There is a case as early as 1293 where, during an argument in 
the Common Bench on a writ by Gossefeld Sgt, an amicus is reported to have intervened 
to say that “he has seen a case where the assign had brought this writ”38. The frequency 
of the amicus curiae appearing in the early days “seems to have been over looked”39. 
  
It is safe to assume that with the gradual increase in the number of trained lawyers 
and the availability of legal representation in all criminal cases, the need for bystander 
intervention ceased. Commenting on the amicus practice in the 1980s, J. M. L. Evans, 
Official Solicitor in England, observed: 
It is …usually invoked where it is considered by the court that an important point 
of law is involved which the court wishes fully argued, and which is unlikely to 
be dealt with by the parties before it. I think it is practically unknown in my 
experience for such procedure to be initiated by a bystander as indicated in these 
works.40 
(c) Preserving the honour of the court: In the celebrated case of Protector v. Geering, 
decided in 1656, the purpose of the amicus was discussed in the following terms: 
It is for the honour of the court to avoid error in their judgments. The Court ex-
officio ought to examine…into errors, though not moved. Barbarism will be 
introduced, if it be not admitted to inform the court of such gross and apparent 
errors in offices.41 
In the result the amicus curiae was permitted to move the court to quash a previous order 
made in error.42  
 
(d) Oral “shepardizing”: Yet another theory as to how the amicus curiae came to be 
relates to its function at common law as a form of oral “shepardizing”43, the drawing of 
the attention of the judge to previously decided cases. With the lack of proper reporting 
of cases at that time, the need for assistance for the courts could have become greater and 
more pronounced. It is suggested that the amicus submissions were therefore “originally 
intended to provide the court with impartial information that was beyond its notice or 
expertise, which is where the name amicus curiae, or ‘friend of the court’ is derived”44. 
 
                                                 
37
 Ibid. at 220. 
38
 Reported in Y.B. 21 Edw. I, 149. See ibid. at 314. 
39
 Cohen, ibid. at 220, n. (z). 
40
 In a communication dated November 12, 1969, cited in Levy, supra note 11 at 95, n. 12. 
41
 (1656), Hardres 85, 145 E.R. 394. 
42
 The court made reference to a case reported in 7 Ed. 4 to support the decision. 
43
 Krislov, supra note 2 at 695. 
44
 Allison Lucas, “The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First Amendment Litigation” (1998 – 1999) 26 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1605 at 1607, cited in Jared B. Cawley, “Friend of the Court: How the WTO Justifies 
the Acceptance of the Amicus Curiae Brief from Non-Governmental Organisations” (2004) 23 Penn State 
International Law Review 47, n. 1. 
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(e) Overcoming the shortcomings of the adversarial system: The most frequently cited 
explanation for its presence in the common law and a consequent deduction that it has 
obvious common law beginnings, is that it served as a useful and convenient tool to 
overcome the shortcomings of the adversarial system which is essentially “partisan” or 
“bi-polar”.45 
 
The essence of the quest for justice in an adversarial system is that it is restricted 
to the resolution of the dispute between the parties to the dispute and confined to the 
issues that have been raised in the course of this dispute. There is no wider third party or 
public interest involvement beyond the outcome. The interests of parties not “formally 
represented” are generally irrelevant in a traditional judicial setting.46 The very nature of 
legal proceedings in a common law adversarial system, the argument goes, compelled the 
accommodation of an independent adviser who could give the court assistance on behalf 
of a third party. Such an increased use of third-party interventions in some jurisdictions in 
recent years has been explained on the additional but tenuous ground of “public 
interest”.47 
 
On the other hand, because common law trials were but a “judicial parody of the 
medieval tournament”48, it is equally improbable that an institution like the amicus 
curiae, which also permits third-party participation, could have had its origins within 
such a trial system known more as a contest between two warring factions. The more 
persuasive argument is that the amicus curiae practice is an integral part of a civil law 
tradition rooted in Roman law with more flexible rules of court appearance and 
representation. It is not, therefore, surprising that the institution has existed in many civil 
law jurisdictions including France for a long time49 and has found its way naturally into 
international tribunals50 which have a substantial civil law tradition and influence. Like 
many other legal institutions, this Roman practice became incorporated in the English 
common law.51 
 
It seems more logical to think that, having found its way into the common law 
system, the amicus curiae later developed and has remained in some jurisdictions such as 
the United States as more of an adversarial weapon.52 In others, it largely retained the 
purity of its ancient Roman form. The institution has survived remarkably in some form 
or other simply because of its adaptability. It has meant, since leaving Roman hands, 
different things to different people but the title has, rather remarkably, endured except, 
until recently, in the United Kingdom.53 
                                                 
45
 Williams, supra note 12 at 367.  
46
 “The Amicus Curiae”, supra note 12. 
47
 See Sarah Hannet, “Third Party Intervention: In the Public Interest?” [2003] P.L. 128. 
48
 Charles Maechling Jr., “Borrowing from Europe’s Civil Law Tradition” (1991) 77 A.B.A. J. 59 at 59. 
49
 Angell, supra note 12. 
50
 Isabel Davies et al., “INTA Experience Shows Value of Amicus Briefs” (2005) 154 Managing 
Intellectual Property 19; Daryl A. Mundis & Fergal Gaynor, “Current Developments at the Ad hoc 
International Tribunals” (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 879; Cawley, supra note 44. 
51
 Rawle, supra note 16 at 138. 
52
  Krislov, supra note 2. 
53
 See note 138 and the accompanying text. 
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B. The Amicus Curiae from Roman Times 
 
That the amicus curiae originated from Roman law practices has been suggested by a 
number of writers.54 The most commonly cited works in support of the Roman roots 
theory are the seminal article by Samuel Krislov in the Yale Law Journal in 196355, 
Ernest Angell’s56 1967 article in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly and 
more recently that of Michael K. Lowman in 199257. 
 
Angell puts his view in a single line that the “device was known in Roman law” 
without any references to Roman law sources for this proposition. Lowman in turn cites 
Angell, Harper and Etherington, and Covey,58 none of whom makes any reference to 
Roman law texts or writings of Roman scholars to support his view. Harper and 
Etherington say no more than that the amicus curiae has had a long and respected role in 
the U.S. legal system and “before that in the Roman law”59. 
 
Covey refers to the third edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1914) for what he 
considers to be a doubtful suggestion that the amicus practice is based on the “Roman 
consilium, an officer of the Roman Court appointed by the judge to advise him on points 
on which he was in doubt”60. Unfortunately, the difficulty with these views has always 
been the lack of supporting references to Roman scripts or sources or to the writings of 
Roman law scholars.  
 
According to Covey, there are two “significant differences” between the amicus 
practice and the consilium practice which raise a “serious doubt” that the amicus practice 
originated from the Roman consilium practice. It is interesting to note what Covey 
regards as the two key differences between the amicus and consilium practices to doubt 
the amicus curiae’s Roman roots61: First, the consilium could not advise the court on his 
own initiative, as the amicus curiae may, but could only act at the request of the court. 
Second, the consilium when requested by the court could act against a criminal 
defendant, while an amicus curiae may never appear against a criminal defendant.  
 
With respect, as will be discussed elsewhere in this article, it is these two features 
that support the amicus curiae’s Roman origins. The amicus curiae was traditionally an 
                                                 
54
 See e.g., “The Amicus Curiae”, supra note 12; Harper & Etherington, supra note 12; Lowman, supra 
note 10 at 1244; Angell, supra note 12; Harris, supra note 12; Schmidt, supra note 12; Williams, supra 
note 12 at 367; Doron & Totry-Jubran, supra note 10. 
55
 Krislov, supra note 2. 
56
 Angell, supra note 12. 
57
 Lowman, supra note 10 at 1244, n. 4. 
58
 Covey, supra note 11; Harper & Etherington, supra note 12. 
59
 Harper & Etherington, ibid., at 1176. They make no references to any sources for this attribution to 
Roman law. 
60
 Bouvier’s comment was that “There was in that day also the ‘amicus consiliari’ who was ready to make 
suggestions to the advocate and this amicus was called a ‘ministrator’, citing Cic. de Orat.         
61
 Covey, supra note 11 at 34-35. His only concession appears to be that the consilium practice was the 
“source of those facets of the amicus practice that are similar to it” without stating what these similarities 
are. 
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independent advisor to the court, appointed by the court to provide assistance to the court 
and this is the amicus practice that still exists in some parts of the world. Covey appears 
to have been influenced by the amicus practice that presently exists in the United States 
which represents a stark departure from its original practices in ancient Rome. 
 
1. The Roman connection 
 
Is there then any substance in the theory that the amicus curiae is of Roman origin?   
 
Roman records and the writings of Roman law scholars sufficiently indicate that 
the amicus curiae has its roots in Roman traditions and legal systems. The evidence for 
the Roman origins of the amicus curiae is strong. It can be traced to the early third 
century when the consilium and the jurists played an important part in all aspects of 
Roman life.62 It certainly pre-dates the English common law amicus practice and like 
many other legal institutions was incorporated in the English legal system with 
subsequent changes in various forms in many common law countries. 
 
Rather significantly, the amicus practice is also found in the French courts63 and 
in the civil law systems which have their roots in Roman law.64 This is hardly surprising 
given the extensive influence the Roman traditions have had upon the legal systems of 
Western Europe and, through colonialism, its spread “from Holland to South Africa, Sri 
Lanka and Indonesia; from France to Quebec, Louisiana and francophone Africa; and 
from Spain to Texas, South America and the Phillipines”65. The Roman tradition has also 
been seen in Japan, Turkey and to some extent in China.66 It is also prevalent in 
international tribunals which have adopted the amicus practice without much difficulty,67 
                                                 
62
 In John Crook, Consilium Principis: Imperial Councils and Counsellors from Augustus to Diocletian, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), the author, who is an eminent Roman law scholar, cites 
Dio, Herodian and the Scriptores Historiae Augustae as providing interesting material for the amici in the 
late second and early third centuries. 
63
 Angell, supra note 12. See also David W. Duncan, “A Little Tour in France: Surrogate Motherhood and 
Amici Curiae in the French Legal System” (1993 – 1994) 21 W. St. U. L. Rev. 447; Dinah Shelton, “The 
Participation of Non-governmental Organisations in International Judicial Proceedings” (1994) 88 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 611. The writer owes a debt of gratitude to the late Mr. Debouzy and his colleagues in the Paris law 
firm of August & Debousy who furnished the writer with information on the role of the amicus curiae in 
French law. The French Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes an amicus from an intervenor, expert 
witness and consultant. There is now specific provision under French law for an amicus curiae’s 
appointment in respect of competition law, labour law and discrimination cases. 
64
 A.D.E. Lewis & D.J. Ibbertson, eds., The Roman Law Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994) at 7; George Mousourakis, The Historical and Institutional Context of Roman Law (England: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003) at 438. 
65
 Lewis & Ibbertson, ibid. at 14. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 For information on the acceptance of the amicus curiae in international tribunals see e.g., Arndt 
Kaubisch, “Letters from Friends: The Admissibility of Amicus Curiae Briefs in WTO Dispute Settlement” 
(2004) European Law Students' Association Selected Papers on European Law, online: European Law 
Students' Association   
<http://www.elsa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/elsa_international/PDF/SPEL/SPEL04_1_KAUBISCH.pdf>; 
Cawley, supra note 44; Shelton, supra note 63; Duncan B. Hollis, “Private Actors in Public International 
Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty” (2002) 25 B.C. Int’l. & Comp. L. 
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international law itself being the “most substantial flowering of the Roman legal 
tradition”68. 
 
It is when one has regard to Roman traditions that the Roman origins of the 
amicus curiae practice become uncontroversial. The Romans had what Roman law 
scholar John Crook describes as “an immemorial tradition that men in positions of 
responsibility should not take decisions alone”69. The opinions of the consilium were of 
an advisory character only and were not binding on the Emperor. The consilium assisted 
the Emperor by providing advice in preparing legislative proposals and administrative 
orders and in carrying out judicial inquiries.70 According to Crook, Roman literary 
sources dwell at length about amici and their advice, “enough to show that we are dealing 
with a subject of the first importance”71. In the Roman Republic, all policies and 
decisions were the result of conciliar discussion. Roman custom simply imposed a moral 
obligation to consult.  
 
In carrying out his duties, even the Emperor was assisted by a council of advisers 
referred to as the consilium principis. This was initially composed of close friends or 
amici of the Emperor.72 Thus the term ‘amicus curiae’ which in Latin, the language of 
the Romans, means a ‘friend of the court’, seems to make perfect sense when seen in a 
purely Roman context. One can, therefore, more readily accept where the strange terms 
amicus curiae or ‘friend of the court’ or ‘my learned friend’, a term not always used with 
a great degree of comfort in the present day legal world, must have originated from.  
 
It was also in ancient Rome that academic lawyers or jurists began the practice of 
giving consilia or opinions to courts on disputed points of law.73 In the later Republican 
period (367 B.C. – 27 B.C.), a group of Roman jurists practised in private law. The 
activities of these jurists were in general similar to the pontiffs’. They consisted of 
“giving legal advice to citizens, magistrates and judges (respondere); providing 
assistance to litigants on matters of legal procedure, drafting legal documents such as 
wills and contracts”74. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Rev. 235, online: Boston College 
<http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/04_FMS.htm>. 
68
 Lewis & Ibbertson, supra note 64 at 13. 
69
 Crook, supra note 62 at 4; E.T. Salmon, Book Review of Consilium Principis: Imperial Councils and 
Counsellors from Augustus to Diocletian by John Crook, 11:1 The Phoenix 39. 
70
 Ibid. Every Emperor had a consilium of his amici which helped him make all purposes be it 
administrative, political, legal or judicial: Salmon, ibid. at 40. 
71
 Crook, supra note 62 at 26, citing Dio, Herodian and the Scriptores Historiae Augustae as providing 
interesting material for the amici in the late second and early third centuries. 
72
 Cassius Dio 53.21; Suetonius, div. Aug. 35, cited in Mousourakis, supra note 64 at 247-248. For a 
detailed study of the consilium principis, see Crook, ibid.   
73
 Lewis & Ibbertson, supra note 64 at 4. 
74
 Cicero, de orat. 1.48.212; Topica 17.65-66; Varro, de r.r.2.3.5; D.4.4.3.1. (Ulpianus), etc., cited in 
Mousourakis, supra note 64 at 190. 
 13
Roman practice, however, demanded that the consilium be consulted and it was 
the “regular practice”75 of lay magistrates to follow such advice. The magistrates were 
dependent on the consilium’s advice because of the amici’s “distinguished descent, their 
prestige or their connections and indeed partly through the arbitrary drawing of lots”76. 
The Roman amici were highly regarded for their legal knowledge and expertise. These 
were the wise men of the law whose opinions were respected and invariably followed.77  
Roman Emperor Hadrian (A.D. 117 – 138) started the practice of employing leading 
jurists as members of his consilium.78  The giving of such legal advice is said to have 
remained the main feature of these jurists’ work for more than four centuries.79 
 
Emperor Augustus (63 B.C. – A.D. 14), the first emperor to rule the Roman 
empire, had issued an ordinance by which he conferred upon the most distinguished 
jurists the right to publicly give opinions in the name of the emperor (ius pubice 
respondendi). The important role of consultant on legal matters was thus confined to a 
relatively small circle of specially qualified experts of high social standing.80 These 
jurists were referred to as iurisconsulti or iurisprudentes. They were chosen from the 
senatorial order partly because of the high reputation commanded by the senatorial class 
and its peculiar practice of gratuitously safeguarding the public interest. The giving of the 
legal opinions remained the central feature of the jurists’ work until the latest period of 
classical jurisprudence, that is, for more than four centuries.81 
 
The central difficulty in pointing to the Roman law as the source of the amicus 
curiae is that that term does not appear in Roman scripts or writings in reference to jurists 
who had performed that function since the third or fourth century. There are constant 
references to offices of the amici, consillari, iurisconsulti or iurisprudentes, ius pubice 
respondendi and ministrator but not to an amicus curiae. This does not necessarily 
indicate that the institution did not exist in Roman times, as explicit evidence of even 
renowned Roman institutions is often unavailable in Roman scripts.  
 
According to the late Professor E. T. Salmon, an eminent Roman law scholar, it 
has always proved “uncommonly difficult” to discover exactly what the machinery of 
consultation in Rome was.82 Scholars are aware of the “evanescent and casual”83 nature 
of the ancillary evidence. For example, the ancient Roman writers were not explicit about 
                                                 
75
 Fritz Schulz, Principles of Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936) at 207. The advice was 
“probably seldom absent and may frequently have been decisive”: Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to 
Roman Legal and Constitutional History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) at 97. 
76
 Kunkel, ibid. 
77
 Alan Watson, The Spirit of the Roman Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995) at 206. This was 
a task held in great prestige: Watson at 1123. 
78
 Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946) at 101; Mousourakis, 
supra note 64 at 247. See also Crook, supra note 62 at 58-59. 
79
 Kunkel, supra note 75. 
80
 Bruns, Fontes 1, no.119, cited in Mousourakis, supra note 64 at 291, n. 41. See also Watson, supra note 
77 at 1123; ibid. at 108-109. 
81
 Kunkel, ibid. at 97, 108; Watson, ibid. at 123. 
82
 Salmon, supra note 69. Professor Salmon was a world-renowned Roman historian and scholar who 
taught at McMaster University in Canada for more than 43 years. 
83
 Ibid. 
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the way an Emperor reached a policy decision and not one uses the expression ‘consilium 
principis’, or the imperial council, even though every Roman ruler had a council of his 
friends, “for all manner of purpose, administrative, political, legal”84. Not even Cassius 
Dio, who was himself a member of the consilium, used the term “consilium principis”, 
although it obviously existed.85 
 
IV. The Types of Amici Curiae 
 
Having examined the origins of the amicus curiae, one can, borrowing partly from Doron 
and Jubran86 classify the amicus curiae into four categories to better understand its 
historical development. 
 
A. The Classic or Traditional Amicus 
 
Traditionally, when a court is of the view that it needs more assistance than can be 
adequately or appropriately provided by the parties before it, it may appoint another 
lawyer whom it considers has sufficient expertise and competency to give independent or 
neutral advice to it. The purpose of the amicus then is to advise or assist the court in 
arriving at its decision and not to represent the interests of any party or cause.  
 
In a number of countries, an amicus is normally appointed if the court is of the 
view that a case involves important questions of law of public interest; if a party that is 
unrepresented would not be able to assist the court; or if the points of law do not concern 
the parties involved but is nevertheless a matter of concern to the court.   
 
The amicus is thus not an advocate, or intervenor or a party to the proceedings. In 
the Commonwealth countries, courts developed other institutions if they required third 
party interests to be represented or watched over. For instance, pro bono lawyers may 
represent an unrepresented defendant and in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, counsel 
may be present to hold a watching brief87 at the discretion of the court to watch over the 
interests of a witness or victim in a trial or the estate of a deceased or a potential 
defendant in a Coroner’s inquiry.88 
 
1. Presence of Roman amici characteristics 
 
                                                 
84
 Ibid. at 40. 
85
 Dio 75.16.4; 76.17.1; ibid.  
86
 Doron & Totry-Jubran, supra note 10, who use the three classifications of the Classic Amicus, the 
Supportive Amicus and the Political Amicus. For another discussion on the “principal categories of amici”, 
see Angell, supra note 12 at 1019-20. 
87
 For an examination of the use of watching briefs in Australia and Malaysia, see Patmalar Ambikapathy, 
“The Use of A Watching Brief as a Legal Tool for the Protection of Child Victims in the Criminal Justice 
Process”, online: Australian Institute of Criminology  
<http://www.aic.gov.au/events/aic%20upcoming%20events/1988/~/media/publications/proceedings/08/pat
malar.ashx>. 
88
 The watching brief was developed early in England in the Coroners Courts in the interests of potential 
defendants and the estate of the deceased or victims who had an interest in the outcome of the inquiry: 
Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. 3 at 621. 
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Four further characteristics of the amicus curiae, at least as practised previously in the 
United Kingdom and even today in many of the former British colonies, demonstrate a 
remarkable closeness to the original Roman or classic amicus practices.  
 
(a) Legal training: First, like the Roman jurists who formed the consilium, the amici are 
legally trained persons.89 
 
(b) Appointment by the court: Second, both could act only at the request or upon the 
appointment of the court. This may only be done at the court’s invitation or with its 
permission and that too if the public interest requires it. Consistent with its Roman roots, 
the amicus practice is invoked if the court decides it needs the help of an impartial and 
wise friend, in addition to what the parties can offer to the court. 
 
In David Ma Wai-kwan, Mortimer V.P. in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, in 
rejecting a Senior Counsel’s offer of assistance to the court, explained that this was 
against the concept of the amicus curiae: 
Ms Gladys Li, SC appeared to offer her services to the Court---it would seem as 
amicus. For my part, there were serious problems about her locus standi. For 
obvious reasons it would be difficult for the court to accept as its amicus counsel 
who appears without invitation.90   
Similarly, in the Malaysian case of Tai Choi Yu, the High Court ruled that an 
amicus curiae must be appointed by the court on its own initiative and not be a volunteer: 
Who is an amicus curiae? In P Ramanatha Aiyar`s The Law Lexicon (2nd Ed, 
1997), amicus curiae is defined as a friend of the court, being a person who 
voluntarily or on invitation of the court, and not on the instruction of any party 
helps the court in any judicial proceedings. In the instant case notwithstanding 
that the senior Federal Counsel has volunteered to help the court in her capacity as 
amicus curiae, however, in my view she can only be heard if invited by the court 
to do so.91 
The point of course is that a third party, unless allowed to appear as an intervenor 
under specific rules of the court, has no locus standi to address a court of law unless so 
permitted by the court. It is the appointment of the third party as amicus curiae that 
confers upon him the locus standi.92 
                                                 
89
 A friend of the court is a person, usually a barrister who, with the court’s permission, may advise the 
court on a point of law or on a matter of practice: United States Tobacco Co. v. Minister for Consumer 
Affairs [1988] 83 A.L.R. 79 (F.C.A.) [US Tobacco]. 
90
 David Ma Wai-kwan, supra note 9 at 359. 
91
 Tai Choi Yu, supra note 5, approved by the Court of Appeal in Nadarajan s/o Verayan, supra note 9. The 
court, however, permitted counsel to appear as the amicus curiae as the case concerned a suit against a 
judge for an alleged libel contained in a written judgment and this was considered as a matter of public 
interest. See also Re Application by Hamid bin Hassan, supra note 9; TSC Education Sdn. Bhd. v. Kolej 
Yayasan Pelajaran Mara [2002] 5 M.L.J. 577 at 584-585 (H.C.) [TSC Education]. 
92
 See Tai Choi Yu, supra note 5; Re Application by Hamid bin Hassan, ibid.; TSC Education, ibid.; David 
Ma Wai-kwan, supra note 9. For a different view, see Chan, supra note 25 at 402 (commenting on the 
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(c) Non-partisan advisor: Third, an amicus curiae is not a party to the proceedings and is 
an independent, non-partisan advisor to the court. Thus, in the Australian case of US 
Tobacco, the court emphasised: 
An amicus curiae (as opposed to an intervenor) has no personal interest in the 
case as a party and does not advocate a point of view in support of one party or 
another.93 
A similar view was expressed very early by a South African court: 
But the point is also made that it is not the function of an amicus to seek to 
undertake the management of a cause…I think we should be laying down a 
dangerous precedent if we were to allow intervention of this kind.94 
In Allen, Lord Salmon, in pointing out that an amicus curiae was not an intervenor, 
explained the amicus’s role thus: 
Apparently, however, for fear lest we might be in need of still further help from 
the Bar in doing justice between the parties, the Law Society has thoughtfully 
provided us with the services of an amicus curiae. I had always understood that 
the role of an amicus curiae was to help the court by expounding the law 
impartially, or if one of the parties were unrepresented, by advancing the legal 
arguments on his behalf. As I listened to Mr. Wilmer's cogent and forceful 
argument, I gained the impression - although no doubt it was an illusion - that in 
reality he held a watching or indeed a speaking brief on behalf of hardly impartial 
third parties who feared that their interests or rather those of their members might 
be prejudiced should these appeals be dismissed.95 
For this reason, an amicus opinion to the court, like the consillari’s advice to the 
Roman judges, could be against the interests of a criminal defendant if that was the view 
honestly held by the amicus curiae and considered the best assistance that could be 
provided to the appointing court in arriving at a just decision. Indeed, in keeping with 
these historical traditions of an independent advisor to the court, in Public Prosecutor v. 
Mazlan bin Maidun96, the Singapore Court of Appeal heard and accepted the submissions 
of the amicus that the court should decide the questions of law before the court in favour 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hong Kong decision in David Ma Wai-kwan, supra note 9). The writer argues that an amicus necessarily 
lacks locus and that the question of locus and amicus intervention in that case should have been considered 
separately in view of the “current liberal tide on locus” in Hong Kong. Professor Chan does not appear to 
have accepted that it is the granting of a right to appear in court and participate in the proceedings that 
gives the amicus curiae the locus standi in that court. 
93
 US Tobacco, supra note 89. 
94
 Connock’s Motor Co. Ltd. (SA), supra note 9 at 356. 
95
 Allen, supra note 9 at 266 (C.A.) [emphasis added].    
96
 [1992] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 968 (C.A.). 
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of the prosecution and against the interests of the defendant, despite the fact that he was 
unrepresented.97 
 
In that controversial decision, the Court of Appeal accepted the submission of the 
prosecution that the High Court had been wrong in rejecting the police statements made 
by the accused and in concluding that the accused had a constitutional right against self-
incrimination and to be informed by the police of his right to silence, as provided by the 
Criminal Procedure Code, before being questioned by the police. It is the invitation or 
appointment by the court rather than by an interested party that ensures neutrality so 
essential to the perceived integrity of the amicus curiae process. 
 
Courts have had occasion to emphasise the essential differences between a 
traditional amicus curiae and an intervenor. In Re Northern Ireland Rights Commission98, 
the House of Lords had to consider whether the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission could intervene in proceedings before the Northern Ireland courts and 
tribunals on points of human rights law. Lord Slynn acknowledged the difference 
between an amicus curiae who keeps within “the limits of a non-partisan view of a 
particular case”99, and an intervenor and one who advocates a cause. Lord Hobhouse 
dismissed the Commission’s claim to act as an amicus curiae, on the ground that the 
Commission’s objective was to argue “strenuously for its view of human rights and their 
protection”100 and not to fulfil the role of the amicus which was to assist the court. In 
effect, the judges refused to permit the ancient institution of the amicus curiae to provide 
a cover for what really is a “more radical innovation to the judicial process.”101  
 
Even in the United States there have been cases where the courts have refused a 
third party to participate as an amicus where he has “a special pecuniary interest in the 
defendant’s perspective” or where he “makes no attempt to present himself as a neutral 
party”102. 
 
(d) Position of prestige: Fourth, as in the case of the Roman jurists who gave advice to 
the consilium or the judges, an amicus curiae is an unpaid honorary position of prestige. 
There is an inherent conflict in loyalties between a hired hand espousing a cause on 
behalf of his client and an independent advisor whose only aim is to ensure that the court 
arrives at a correct decision. A court’s invitation to be an amicus in Singapore and 
Malaysia, for example, is highly regarded and is a recognition of the standing, expertise 
and intellect of the lawyer so appointed by the court. Such a recognition by the Supreme 
Court is considered as a reward in itself. 
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 See “Accused has no constitutional right to remain silent – lawyer” The Straits Times (13 October 1972); 
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100
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Legal Probs. 449 at 545. See also Hannett, supra note 47. 
102
 Banner, supra note 32 at 112, n. 2. 
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B. The Bystander or Intervening Good-Samaritan Amicus 
 
It was in the common law of the Middle Ages that the amicus apparently took on a new 
role he did not have in Roman law.103 That is, as a bystander-intervenor, to offer factual 
or legal information to the court as noted earlier in this article. A bystander’s intervention 
or contribution may have been principally due to three reasons which have been 
considered earlier in this article. 
 
First, the typical trial in the 14th century was conducted in the public city square 
and was open to intervention from the spectators. Although there are some recorded 
examples of such intervention, the extent to which this was done and the acceptance of 
such information or knowledge from spectators and onlookers by the court remains 
unclear. Second, the defendant in a criminal case was not entitled to be defended by 
counsel and because of this and the harshness of the punishment for convicted criminals 
in those times, parties present at the trial could have intervened to assist the accused by 
providing information to the court. Third, by the 13th century the small but active body of 
early English barristers known as serjeants-at-law were regularly consulted and were 
frequently present in court to offer their services as shown by the number of cases 
reported in the Year Books.104 
 
Even in the United States before the 1870s, amici were known to offer their 
advice to the court orally and spontaneously if they happened to be present in court 
during the hearing.105 In present times there have been occasions when courts have 
permitted or requested lawyers present in court to assist the court as amicus curiae or 
when they have been involved in the proceedings at an earlier stage.106 
 
C. The Supportive Amicus 
 
There are three categories of ‘supportive amici’ that have developed in later years. One is 
the amicus appointed by the court to present the case on behalf of an undefended party. 
This is out of a sense of fairness to ensure equal representation especially where legal aid 
is unavailable.107 
 
The second is a third party with a “personal and direct interest in one of the 
parties in the case”. Prior to the introduction of the procedural rules for intervenors, there 
have been cases where the amicus was permitted in certain circumstances to perform that 
function. Thus in the 1736 case of Coxe v. Phillips, a case which involved a collusive 
dispute over a promissory note, the defendant had used the suit to embarrass a third party 
named Muilman by claiming that she was unable to enter into a contract as she was 
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married to Muilman. Muilman was able to obtain the services of an amicus curiae to 
show that the marriage had been void as she had then had another husband. This case has 
been viewed as an example that even in England “a step had been taken towards change 
from neutral friendship to positive advocacy and partisanship”108, although it could as 
easily be seen as a typical case of an amicus providing information to the court to avoid 
an error. 
 
The third group are the government officers who have been permitted to appear as 
amici in the wider public interest to inform the court of public policy issues. The Official 
Solicitor in England appeared in Rondell v. Worsley109 to argue whether a member of the 
Bar was liable for negligence in the conduct of a case in court. In Morelle Ltd. v. 
Wakeling110, the Court of Appeal invited the Attorney-General to present the Crown’s 
position regarding the claim of a foreign company that although it had no licence to own 
a property in question the Crown had failed to intervene. Though not a party in what was 
in fact a rent dispute between two other parties, the Crown’s interest as the owner would 
be affected by the outcome of the case.  
 
Similarly in Times Publishing Bhd. v. S. Sivadas111 the Singapore Attorney–
General was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the court in a suit which concerned 
Parliamentary privilege. In another case the Solicitor–General was similarly appointed by 
the High Court to assist in deciding whether a suit commenced against the Government of 
Malaysia in Singapore, when Singapore was a part of Malaysia, could be continued after 
1965 when Singapore was no longer a part of Malaysia.112 
 
In the United States third party participation began when the U.S. courts allowed 
the Attorney-General of the various states to present their views as amici curiae. Major 
constitutional cases have involved the U.S. government’s participation as amicus curiae 
even when it was not a party to the proceedings.113 Government representatives are 
identified more easily with upholding the public interest and, according to one observer, 
“like their fourteenth century Roman predecessors government amici educate the court 
and help it to avoid error”114. 
 
D. The Political or Modern Amicus 
 
On the other side of the pendulum holding the traditional amicus, concerned only with 
independently assisting the court in its determination of the dispute between the parties, 
lies the modern amicus curiae. Although not a party to the case, the modern amicus often 
has a strong interest in its outcome. In a study of amicus participation in the United States 
between 1790 and 1890, Stuart Banner surprisingly found that the neutral amicus or the 
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traditional friend of the court, offering gratuitous legal advice to assist the courts, had 
ceased to exist in the United States since the 1820s.115 
 
The political or modern amicus that has emerged in its place, is an amicus 
representing an interest group or organisation with a social or political agenda. This 
development in the United States has resulted in a proliferation of the amicus briefs. 
Eighty-five percent of the cases argued before the U.S. Supreme Court, by the end of the 
20th century, involved at least one written amicus brief.116 Between the 1946–2001 
Supreme Court terms, 15,214 briefs were filed in 3,865 cases.117  
 
In 1990, after being overwhelmed with 78 amicus briefs in one abortion rights 
case,118 the U.S. Supreme Court revised its Rule 37 to remind parties that new and 
relevant matters only were helpful to the court and that an amicus brief which did not do 
this “simply burdens the staff and is not favoured”. Concerned with ethical issues in 
1997, the court further required the amicus to indicate whether counsel for a party had 
assisted in writing the brief and to identify every person who had made a monetary 
contribution to the brief.119  
 
In his study of the amicus curiae briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court during the 
1950, 1968, 1982 and 1995 Supreme Court terms, Paul Collins found that the most 
common amici are trade associations (63%), state governments (41.5%), public advocacy 
groups (38.7%), public interest law firms (37.2%) and the U.S. Government (36.4%).120 
Civil rights issues were raised in 60.2% of these briefs.121.The amicus briefs contained, in 
addition to legal arguments (73%), policy (19%), separation of powers (6.9%), 
jurisdictional and non-traditional arguments.122 An earlier study of briefs filed between 
1954 and 1980 concluded that business groups, trade associations, corporations and 
professional associations filed 58% of all briefs. The remaining 42% were filed by public 
interest organisations, consumer groups, religious societies or labour organisations.123  
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Present-day judicial decision-making involves both a legal model consistent with 
a judge’s legal training which requires the interpretation of the law in accordance with 
perceived legislative intent and precedents and an attitudinal model that recognises the 
role of ideology and policy goals.124 There is a need to look at broader social issues and 
policy implications beyond the expertise of a lawyer-amicus.125 In addition, one must be 
conscious of 20th century changes in the U.S. judiciary, in particular, where important 
decisions of the courts have taken on a greater political character.126 The amicus curiae in 
such an environment serves as a flexible judicial tool to cater to the needs of a particular 
legal environment. 
 
Clearly, both the character and the role of the amicus curiae have undergone 
radical changes in the United States and in other developed countries. In most cases the 
American amicus has long gone past the traditional boundaries of his Roman ancestors. 
This has been attributed to the creative use of a flexible judicial tool such as the amicus to 
meet 20th century changes in the legal environment and the changing nature of litigation, 
rather than in the partisanship of lawyers.127 In choosing to push the agendas of business, 
corporate and civil society clients, the modern amici have no doubt parted ways from 
their revered Roman cousins of the same name. That has inevitably led to a further 
blurring of the lines between an amicus and an intervenor or advocate. In some federal 
district courts, the amicus has even been permitted to present oral arguments, to examine 
witnesses, to introduce evidence and even to enforce previous court orders.128 
 
Those who support the American-style modern amici and their briefs point out the 
effect these have on judicial decisions and hence the assistance to the court provided by 
these amici. There is sufficient evidence to show that judges consider and are influenced 
by these briefs.129 Kearney and Merrill in a study of 6000 Supreme Court judgments over 
50 years found that briefs on behalf of institutions such as the American Civil Liberties 
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Union and the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations 
enjoy “above average success”.  Despite its hesitation to acknowledge the influence of 
amicus briefs, the U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally cited an amicus brief in its 
judgments.130 
 
Issues now coming before the courts are a lot more complex and varied than the 
combined experience and expertise of any particular bench which may have limited 
resources to be informed of all relevant issues and interests. Courts can no longer operate 
in an “Olympic remoteness from the social scene”131. In the last few decades, particularly 
in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, as in the United States, there has been an 
increase in litigation involving fundamental freedoms and constitutional interpretation. 
Judges seek information and informed opinion and have invariably welcomed those able 
to render such assistance from both the public and private sectors. The question is 
whether those who elect to appear or file briefs as amici should have a partisan view; and 
if they do, would that kind of assistance be unbecoming of a true ‘friend of the court’? 
 
Those who are critical of the modern development of the ancient institution in 
some jurisdictions may well be entitled to say that, apart from not keeping with the 
original purpose of the amicus curiae, his modern counterpart has turned the courts into a 
political arena for advancing the private interests of social, political and commercial 
groups. The amicus has become the friend of the party or of those who have the budget to 
file such briefs.132 These reasons alone may well not support the modern development of 
the amicus practice in a number of jurisdictions which frown upon the use of the courts 
and the litigation process to put pressure on the political process. 
  
As amicus curiae participation allows groups to influence public policy, this 
method has become the main lobbying technique used by interest groups. It is a cost-
effective way to have access to the highest court in the country. This has also contributed 
to the abuse of the amicus briefs by lawyers known to file briefs to advertise their special 
expertise in the hope that the brief will attract work.133 As is to be expected, there has 
also been criticism that many amicus briefs are not helpful to judges as they frequently 
include duplicative arguments. As observed by an American judge, these constitute a 
waste of judicial resources “in an era of heavy caseloads and public impatience with 
delays and expense of litigation”134. 
 
The numerous and often conflicting amicus briefs filed by numerous parties have 
not always helped courts make informed decisions. They have at times resulted in a 
confusing overload of information and data. Rather significantly, there has been a marked 
rise in non-unanimous decisions in post-war U.S. Supreme Courts as a result. Paul 
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Collins’s findings illustrate that the rise in dissenting judgments in the court can be 
partially attributed to the surge of amicus filings.135 This is because, as Collins argues:  
amicus briefs are able to light the fires of dissensus, motivating justices to express 
their displeasure with the majority’s interpretation of the law. Moreover, by 
providing the justices with a well researched basis on which they can cultivate a 
separate opinion, amicus briefs reduce the resource-costs implicated by the 
decision to author or join a separate opinion.136  
The frequency of dissenting judgments in the U.S. Supreme Court may cause uncertainty 
in the law and may not always be in the public interest.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The amicus curiae has certainly come a long way from his noble Roman beginnings as a 
learned, respected, independent appointee of the court. His role was, as a ‘friend of the 
court’, to gratuitously advise and assist the court in arriving at a just decision. In some 
jurisdictions, particularly in the Commonwealth, the amicus has largely retained that 
function. In others, as in the United States, he has assumed varied roles including that of 
a litigating amicus curiae, a lobbyist, an intervenor and an advocate. 
 
There is thus, a perceived contradiction between the name amicus curiae and the 
role of the modern amicus now accentuated by U.S. Supreme Court rules which require 
him to identify the party he represents and “every person who had made a monetary 
contribution to the brief”137. But has he remained a friend of the court? Ought he to 
perhaps change his name to that of an advisor or intervenor or advocate? This was what 
was done in England in 2001. Following a re-appraisal of the function of the amicus 
curiae, it was decided to drop the name of the amicus curiae for that of an ‘Advocate to 
the Court’. Interestingly, this was to address the problem that “the line between the role 
of an amicus and the intervener has not always been drawn too clearly”138. 
  
If in his new role as counsel representing a trade association, public advocacy 
group or public interest law firm, an amicus’ primary intent is to influence the outcome of 
a decision in his client’s favour, does he disqualify himself from being a ‘friend of the 
court’? But in all litigation cases, are lawyers, in assisting their clients, not also assisting 
the court? They are certainly officers of the court and are regarded as ‘learned friends’ 
even by their adversaries in court. Does the fact that modern amici in some jurisdictions 
are engaged and paid by their clients make a difference to the way the court ought to 
perceive them?  
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It may not be fair or reasonable to expect all amici to emulate their Roman 
brethren and work gratuitously and still be a source of much welcome information and 
research for an overburdened judiciary having to decide increasingly complex questions. 
The number of briefs filed and the diversity of the legal and social issues they represent 
which have been considered by the courts would not have been possible if only the 
classic amicus curiae had continued to operate in the U.S. And do the judges at present 
need the same sort of information and assistance as were once given to their Roman 
brethren who were not quite schooled in the law as the amicus curiae then was? They are 
new friends perhaps but it is difficult to deny that the modern or political amici are still 
friends of the court. 
